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The second phase of the Southport inquiry has begun in London, with families of children who survived the 2024 attack calling for urgent action to prevent similar incidents in the future.
Opening statements are being heard on Monday, 5 October 2026, following the first phase of the inquiry, which found significant failures in the way authorities managed the risks associated with Axel Rudakubana before the attack.
The inquiry is examining the circumstances surrounding the deaths of six-year-old Bebe King, seven-year-old Elsie Dot Stancombe and nine-year-old Alice da Silva Aguiar, who were killed during a Taylor Swift-themed dance workshop at the Hart Space community centre in Southport on 29 July 2024.
Eight other children were injured, alongside dance instructor Leanne Lucas and businessman John Hayes, who was among the first people at the scene.
Sara Sutherland KC, representing the families of 19 children who survived the attack, told the inquiry that families had already “paid an unimaginable price” and should not have to wait indefinitely for meaningful change.
She identified three questions that families want the second phase to address.
The first is: What is the problem that authorities are trying to solve?
The second asks whether weaknesses in systems designed to prevent violence are problems with the way those systems were designed or with how they were implemented.
The third question is: What actually works when all the evidence from the second phase has been considered?
Sutherland described the attack as preventable and said the problems identified during the first phase were recurring systemic issues rather than entirely new failures.
She said families wanted confirmation that lessons had been properly understood and that the inquiry could become a turning point in improving public protection.
The first phase of the inquiry found that several agencies had information about Rudakubana but failed to properly manage and share information about the risks he presented.
William Chapman, representing the families of the three girls who died, said Rudakubana had been known to several authorities and that more effective intervention could potentially have prevented the attack.
He highlighted an incident in October 2019 when Rudakubana contacted Childline.
Chapman argued that someone should have taken responsibility for managing his case at that point and maintained a complete picture of his history and risk profile.
He also referred to an incident in March 2022 when Rudakubana was found carrying a knife on a bus.
The families are not calling for the Prevent programme to be expanded to cover every individual who may present a risk. Instead, their legal representatives are asking whether another agency or structure should take responsibility for cases that do not meet the threshold for Prevent intervention but may still involve serious risks.
The second phase will also examine the role of the internet and social media in the development and behaviour of people who become fixated on violence.
Pete Watherby KC, representing adult survivors of the attack, said the online environment presents significant challenges for authorities.
He acknowledged that there was room for greater regulation but warned that controlling online content and activity is complex because of the speed at which platforms and technology are developing.
The inquiry's chairman, Sir Adrian Fulford, previously made recommendations concerning the monitoring and coordination of interventions for children and young people considered to present a high risk of serious harm.
The second phase will examine whether existing systems are capable of identifying, monitoring and disrupting dangerous online activity.
The inquiry's first report identified five major areas of systemic failure in the handling of Rudakubana.
These included failures to take responsibility for managing the risks he presented, problems with information sharing between agencies and a tendency to explain away some of his behaviour rather than respond to the potential risks.
The report also identified failures relating to his online activity and significant parental failures, including concerns around boundaries, access to knives and weapons, and information that was not reported to authorities before the attack.
The first phase concluded that the attack could and should have been prevented.
The government has also begun acting on one of the recommendations from the first phase of the inquiry.
Rudakubana admitted producing ricin, a highly toxic biological substance, which was discovered by police during a search of his home.
The government now plans to strengthen controls on castor beans containing ricin and rosary peas containing abrin. The plants and seeds have legitimate uses, including gardening and decoration, but the government intends to place relevant materials under tighter controls.
The move follows the inquiry's recommendation for greater regulation of access to castor beans.
The second phase will look more broadly at how England and Wales manage people considered to be violence-fixated individuals, where extreme violence may be a concern without ideology being the primary driver.
It will examine the effectiveness of current arrangements for identifying and managing such risks, as well as the role of online platforms and social media.
The inquiry will also consider laws and enforcement surrounding offensive weapons and items with blades or points.
Five independent experts are expected to contribute evidence, drawing on several case studies involving people who were considered to be fixated on violence.
The inquiry is ultimately expected to make further recommendations on how agencies, government departments and other organisations could improve their ability to identify risks and intervene before serious violence occurs.
For the families involved, the second phase is about more than establishing what happened before the attack. Their representatives have stressed the importance of turning the inquiry's findings into practical changes.
Adult survivors have also called for action that can reduce the likelihood of similar attacks while maintaining the rights and freedoms of the wider public.
The inquiry will now continue examining the evidence surrounding risk management, online activity, weapons controls and the responsibilities of public authorities.
